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PROPOSED LEGISLATION FOR HIGHWAY
CORRIDOR PROTECTION
ALLEN FONOROFFt
I. INTRODUCTION
The urbanization of the United States is accelerating at a very rapid
pace. Many states and regions are beginning to feel and will continue
to feel the effects of uncontrolled growth. One consequence of such
growth is the destruction of scenic values which are vital to the en-
vironment in which man must live.
The problems incident to urbanization have aroused considerable
interest in the preservation of open space and scenic values. Uncon-
trolled urban sprawl, for example, has displaced thousands of acres
of agriculture, threatened the preserves for wildlife, despoiled the
forests and mountains, and created serious problems of flooding and
water pollution. The reasons are many and stem from the rapid eco-
nomic expansion which the United States has been experiencing.
Accompanying the significant increase in real income has been the
continued growth in automobile ownership, highway construction,
and automobile travel. On the other hand, because of the economics
of agriculture, the small farm is quickly disappearing and when it is
not replaced by a more intensive type of land use or consolidated into
larger farms, it is allowed to literally go to seed. The landscape
quickly deteriorates with wild growth because the farmer cannot afford
to maintain the pasture land, fields, and orchards. What then is to
become of this unproductive land? These are among a few of the
problems with which government must grapple.
Many states, such as Vermont, count scenery among their most
precious possessions. It is also an asset of regional and national impor-
tance. The preservation of natural and man-made beauty is so much
a part of American heritage and well-being that government, at al-
most every level, has become concerned with its protection and en-
hancement and has also become aware that the preservation of beauty
fosters growth and economic maturity. One aspect of scenic preserva-
tion has been isolated for attention and resolution by the State of
Vermont-the preservation of scenic assets along the roadside. With
f Assoc. Professor of Planning, and Director, Office of Community Affairs, Case
Western Reserve University.
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this as a statement of public policy, a critical question arises: what
legal steps can be taken to accomplish effective control over the use
of land along the public highways?
II. IMPLEMENTING PUBLIC POLICY
The implementation of a policy to preserve scenic values along the
roadside can be accomplished through voluntary or mandatory co-
operation among many segments of society. At the political level,
cooperation is required between federal and state programs, among
the various departments of government within the state (highway,
finance, taxation, etc.), between elements of local government (plan-
ning and zoning authorities) and the state, as well as between one
local unit and another. Outside of government, cooperation is re-
quired between various elements of the business community, between
them and all levels of government, and with civic and citizen organi-
zations. In short, there is a multitude of organizational and private
activity representing vested interests, public and private, that must be
coordinated to achieve success. Of major significance is whether the
people are ready and willing to accept the direction of the policy and
its implementation.
The protection of scenic values centers on the roads, for the net-
work of roads and highways has historically been the agency of com-
munication for mankind. Even today, roads play a key role in shap-
ing development and land use. Roads provide the arena from which
citizens and visitors view the beauty or ugliness of the landscape, and
roadside scenery is the most seriously threatened. In the years before
zoning and subdivision regulations, any kind of development was
accepted in the name of progress. Yet there are major policy alterna-
tives that provide a range of choices to guide development. The com-
plex of urban problems is such that traditional attitudes and concepts
of transportation require reappraisal. Can the economic dynamics
of today's society be determined at the local level through voluntary
cooperation? Can they be decided by the highway engineer concerned
with the economics of construction?
The responsibility for policy-making and coordination of activity
designed to exploit the rich resources associated with a highway sys-
tem requires a new approach by the higher levels of government.
Legislative direction at the state level would appear to be an effective
instrument for expressing public policy and for establishing the meth-
ods for preserving scenic values along a state's highway system.
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III. WHY PRESERVE SCENIC VALUES?
Two words supply the answer to the question, "Why preserve
scenic values?" They are economics and aesthetics. Moreover, eco-
nomics and aesthetics can be equated to two other words of legal sig-
nificance-general welfare. The general welfare of every political sub-
division in a state is enriched by the preservation and protection of its
scenic values. As applied to Vermont, for example, the logic is quite
simple:
1. Vermont's scenery is exceptionally beautiful;
2. exceptional beauty attracts people;
8. people impressed by the aesthetics of Vermont, spend money in
the State, and some open new businesses and industries;
4. therefore, the preservation of the State's scenic resources and
beauty can help insure its economic well-being.
The existence of scenic assets has been responsible for attracting
new businesses and industries, permanent residents, part-time sum-
mer and winter residents, and tourists to the state. The influx of peo-
ple helps support existing retail facilities and recreation centers and
creates opportunities for new investment. The state's scenic resources
have been one of the stimulants for increasing employment and real
income. The preservation of scenic and historic assets has led to in-
creased real estate values within and around the areas subject to regu-
lation.
Vermont's natural aesthetic resources generate an estimated annual
expenditure of 189 million dollars in the state.1 Equally important
are the effects of preservation on the economy generally. 2 In view of
the threat to scenic values, protective legislation is required to preserve
and enhance scenic values in order to reinforce the economic viability
of a state, and to achieve the aesthetic objectives and amenities so nec-
essary in a complex urbanizing society. Recognizing these objectives
as valid goals of public policy, Philip H. Hoff, Governor of the State
of Vermont, initiated a study, through the State's Central Planning
Office, aimed at assessing scenic and historic values and the develop-
ment of methods for their preservation.
1. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S PANEL ON SCENERY AND HISTORIC SITES
(1963).
2. See AMxERICAN SOC'Y OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, PLANNING FOR PRESERVA-
TIoN 14, 15 (1964).
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IV. TnE LEGISLATION
The study initiated by the Governor of Vermont resulted in recom-
mendations for new legislative techniques that would deal effectively
with the preservation of the State's scenic values. This legislation was
divided into two major areas for remedial action:
1. Regulation through the use of the police power, and
2. acquisition of the fee or any lesser interest in land through
the use of the power of eminent domain.
After analyzing the nature of scenic assets and the reasons for their
protection and enhancement, careful consideration was given to choos-
ing the appropriate legal tools that would accomplish that objective.
For example, some scenic assets (certain gaps through the Green
Mountains) require complete public ownership. Other assets, such
as the scenery that is in view at short intervals along the highway,
require the acquisition of less than the fee. Finally, there are those
unique scenic assets that can be protected by regulation through the
police power. The focus of this article is on the use of the police
power as an effective method of protecting scenic values.
The proposed legislation was designed to preserve and to enhance
scenic values visually related to Vermont's highways by regulating the
use of land adjacent to such highways. It is but one of several ways
that is used to accomplish the stated goal. The legislation is repro-
duced at the conclusion of this article.
In brief, the legislation classifies areas of unique scenic significance
into two categories-scenic corridors, and scenic sites. The scenic cor-
ridors chosen require immediate protection. The Federal Interstate
Highway System is one such corridor; the other is the system of high-
ways which carries an intermediate volume of traffic and provides un-
usual scenic beauty.
In general, the law prohibits the location of certain obnoxious uses
within one-half mile of the highway right-of-way or between its right-
of-way and a ridgetop, whichever distance is less. There are several
exceptions:
1. The prohibitions do not apply when the highways are located
within cities, incorporated villages, or settled areas;
2. The usual motorist services (motels, eating establishments, and
service stations) are permitted along one major route, ahd within
one-half mile of the right-of-way of any part of an interchange
with a Federal Interstate Highway.
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Permitted residential uses are regulated with respect to minimum lot
area, and the size, location, and lighting of signs are also regulated.
The second item of unique scenic significance that is protected by
the police power is the scenic site. The word "unique" is the key to
this analysis because justification of legislative action will depend to
a great extent upon the special characteristics of this category. The
category includes small cemeteries, covered bridges, and other historic
sites and uses. The same obnoxious uses are forbidden within speci-
fied distances; however, the regulations do not apply to an area pre-
dominantly used for commerce or industry which is specially defined.
Other similar areas of special scenic value-approaches to historic
towns, rural churches, etc.-m@y be designated for similar protection
by a state agency. Standards are set forth to guide the agency in the
selection of such areas and provisions are made for public participa-
tion through hearings. The regulations protect the right to sell farm
produce as well as non-conforming uses that were in active operation
before the passage of the law.
V. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE POLICE POWER
Although the approach taken in the Vermont legislation is limited
to roadside scenery, its implications are much broader. First of all,
a ride in the country affords most people with their primary contact
with scenery. Second, residential, commercial, and industrial develop-
ment tend to follow and concentrate along transportation corridors.
Finally, these corridors offer a variety of experience, traveling as they
do through the city, the suburb, and the countryside. Therefore, the
problems presented are broad, involving not only protection of exist-
ing scenic values, but also positive action to improve and enhance
scenic values.
The proposed legislation attempts to encourage the use of two very
important legal remedies: the police power 3 and the power of eminent
domain. Moreover, the objectives to be achieved are classified into cate-
gories so that the most appropriate and effective legal remedy is used.
A. Private Property
The common law and constitutional rights and obligations that are
a part of the ownership of land have shaped the growth of the United
3. Because of the unique approach of the Vermont legislation, precedent could
not be found in the case law. The discussion of the police power builds up from
analogies with those areas of aesthetic control that have been accepted by the
courts.
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States. These rights and obligations have changed significantly over
the years as required by the forces of survival and growth. It has never
been possible for anyone to do as he pleased on his own land; the con-
trary has often been emotionally announced, with citations; 4 never-
theless, property rights have been adjusted to accommodate the eco-
nomic and social needs of the people.
The continuing complex economic and social problems that con-
front the United States today will require flexibility and not dogma
in refining the concepts of private property and the public interest.
Judicial acceptance of land use controls depends upon the "justice" of
the restriction. Therefore, the questions to be decided are whether
the restrictions imposed are a reasonable method for achieving a rea-
sonable objective; whether the public benefits to be derived are suf-
ficient to justify a restriction on private property; whether the property
owner is able to secure a reasonable use of his land; and whether the
regulations are clear and unambiguous.
B. Police Power
The use of the police power to regulate aesthetics has been the sub-
ject of much litigation for it raises significant constitutional questions.
The use of the police power is limited by constitutional requirements
of due process and equal protection. The courts have laid down very
broad criteria for judicial review of these constitutional concepts. 5
For example, the guarantee of equal protection before the law does
not require the universal application of a legislative act. In keeping
with a valid legislative purpose, distinctions may properly be made in
the application of regulations.6 Nor is the legislature required to be
omniscient and completely solve a problem in one legislative pro-
nouncement.
7
It is fair to conclude, therefore, that a statute which is designed
to protect and promote the economic well-being of the state and thus
the general welfare of its people, and which sets out a course of action,
all of which is directed at a unique classification reasonably related to
the statutory purpose, is a valid and constitutional exercise of the
police power.
4. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 139 (1782).
5. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
6. Railway Express Agency v. New York City, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
7. Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401 (1905).
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C. Reasonable Use of Land
Regulating the use of land so that it remains "open space" raises
constitutional questions of reasonableness. From time to time, some
municipalities have attempted to zone private property for an "ex-
clusive" purpose.8 The constitutional question to be answered in this
situation is whether the land owner has a reasonable expectation of
receiving a reasonable return on his investment-the land.
However interesting the issues raised by these questions may be,
they are not at all applicable to scenery preservation legislation. The
proposed legislation leaves the owner of land considerable latitude
and choice with respect to its use and development within carefully
defined areas of regulation. The legislation prohibits a handful of
uses whose presence within the proscribed areas would completely
frustrate its legitimate objectives. No attempt is made to "freeze"
land in its natural state either by prohibiting all use or so restrictively
regulating land as to render it valueless. 9
D. Aesthetics and the Police Power
Clearly, government may act in the interests of aesthetics when ex-
ercising its power of eminent domain. However, the proposed legisla-
tion sets forth regulations restricting the use of land which does not
involve a "taking," and therefore would not require compensation.
Although the United States Supreme Court has not chosen to speak
definitively on the subject of aesthetics and the police power, a strong
trend has developed within state and federal court decisions which
indicates that beauty will soon be able to enter the halls of justice un-
assisted by the crutches of public health and public safety.1o Aesthetic
8. McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal.2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954); Vernon Park Realty Co. v. City of Mount
Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954). Cf. Greenhills Home Owners
Corp. v. Village of Greenhills, 5 Ohio St. 2d 207, 215 N.E.2d 403 (1963).
9. See, e.g., Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills
Tp., 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963); City of Plainfield v. Borough of Middlesex,
69 N.J. Super. 136, 173 A.2d 785 (Law Div. 1961); Kozesnik v. Montgomery
Township, 24 N.J. 154, 182, 131 A.2d 1, 16 (1957); Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v
Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
. 10. Price, Billboard Regulation Along the Interstate Highway System, 8 KAN.
L. REv. 81 (1959); Laggis, The Role of Aesthetics in the Exercise of Police Power
and its Application to South Dakota's Highway Beautification Statute, 11 SOUTH
DAK. L. REv. 157 (1966). Cf. Powers, Control of Outdoor Advertising, State Im-
plementation of Federal Law and Standards, 38 NEn. L. REv. 541 (1959); Note,
13 SYB. L. REv. 325 (1961); Note, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 899 (1962).
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considerations are inseparable in their effect on considerations other
than health, safety, morals, and are in fact a very important element
of the general welfare. To so narrowly dissect the meaning of general
welfare is contrary to the vast body of knowledge in economics, sociol-
ogy, and other behavioral sciences."
In deciding constitutional questions, the judiciary must evaluate
conflicting social values. Every restriction on the use of real property
is measured against society's desire to achieve the objective for which
the restriction is imposed. The courts have exercised extreme care in
evaluating land-use regulations. In its early history, aesthetics had
been excluded as a legitimate objective of the police power. Today,
however, the courts have traditionally held that aesthetic cofisidera-
tions may be taken into account along with other valid considerations.
There is a long history of judicial land-use control in decisions deal-
ing with common law nuisances.12 Reconciliation of the value of ap-
pearance and the value of "property rights" was difficult because of
the adverse connotation of the word "aesthetic." 3 Beauty was con-
sidered a matter of individual taste and, therefore, beyond the com-
petence of the court."4 The courts made easy distinctions between
activities which were offensive to the senses of smell and hearing, and
balanced the equities in deciding upon damages or injunctive relief."
However, a more recent nuisance decision has recognized a relation-
ship between unsightly nuisances and the right of enjoyment of neigh-
boring properties.' 6
Some courts have taken a very strong position in finding a viable
relationship between aesthetic values and the economic health of a
community. "There are areas in which aesthetics and economics co-
alesce, areas in which a discordant sight is as hard an economic fact
as an annoying odor or sound.""* The rationale for this and other de-
cisions rests firmly on the proposition that the aesthetic controls were
11. See, generally, Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal,
20 Lw & CONTEMP. PROB. 218 (1955).
12. W. PROSSER, TorTs 395 (2d ed. 1955). See also Beuscher & Morrison,
Judicial Zoning Through Recent Nuisance Cases, 1955 Wis. L. R-v. 440.
13. Anderson, Architectural Controls, 12 SYR. L. Rav. 26 (1960).
14. Lane v. City of Concord, 70 N.H. 485, 49 A. 687 (1901).
15. Wade v. Miller, 188 Mass. 6, 73 N.E. 849 (1905).
16. Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 118 W. Va. 608, 191 S.E.
368 (1937).
17. United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 5, 198 A.2d
447, 449 (1964).
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enacted to protect property values, and therefore, the economic health
of the community. 8
The development of criteria for judging aesthetics presents a very
real and a very difficult problem. One difficulty can be found in at-
tempts to apply the same aesthetic yardstick to different types of
aesthetic values. For example, regulating the design and appearance
of buildings, as some communities do through boards of architectural
review, is quite different from regulations designed to protect a com-
munity's scenic and historic heritage. It is not the purpose here to
develop standards for the administration of aesthetic regulations. Suf-
fice it to say that standards are set forth for those aesthetic values with
which the proposed legislation is concerned. It is the state's duty to
select those natural and man-made phenomena that should be pre-
served and protected from any encroachment because to do otherwise
would bring irreparable damage to the total community. This ap-
proach is consistent with the purpose and intent of the Highway
Beautification Act of 1965.19 It is not necessary to evaluate the yard-
stick established by Justice Fuld in People v. Stover.20 Beginning in
1956, Stover protested the tax rate of Rye, New York, by stringing a
clothesline hung with rags across his front yard each year. Six clothes.
lines later, the city amended its zoning ordinance21 and Stover was
convicted of violating the ordinance. In upholding the conviction
and the ordinance the court said, ". . . [the ordinance] simply pro-
scribes conduct which is unnecessarily offensive to the visual sensi-
bilities of the average person." 22
The preservation of the scenic values described and classified in
the proposed legislation is not dependent on the hypothetical average
person. The destruction of these values would in some measure affect
everyone.
18. Hankins v. Borough of Rockleigh, 55 N.J. Super. 132, 150 A.2d 63 (App.
Div. 1959); Borough of Point Pleasant Beach v. Point Pleasant Pavilion Inc., 3
N.J. Super. 222, 66 A.2d 40 (App. Div. 1949); State ex rel. Saveland Park Hold-
ing Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955).
19. At the bill-signing ceremony, President Johnson said ". . . what has been
divinely given by nature will not be recklessly taken away by man."
20. 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272 (1963).
21. The ordinance prohibited the erection or maintenance of clotheslines, dry-
ing racks, poles, etc. in front and side yards abutting a street.
22. 12 N.Y.2d at 468, 191 N.E.2d at 276.
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E. Billboards, Junk Yards, and Other Open Land Uses
One of the strongest and most obvious justifications for the use of
aesthetics within the police power is found in the cases dealing with
signs and billboards. Community indulgence in visual blight had
apparently reached its saturation point at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century. Civic reaction manifested itself in an attack on the
unsightly billboards.23
Community appearance lost the initial skirmish with the courts
holding tenaciously to the doctrine that aesthetic considerations were
beyond the scope of the police power.2 4 A different handle was re-
quired by the courts if the door to the sanctum of the police power
was to be opened. Such a handle was fashioned, but based upon a
legal fiction that is still very much in use today and which adds noth-
ing but confusion to the concept of the police power. Again the United
States Supreme Court showed the way. In 1899, the Massachusetts
legislature limited the height of buildings in the vicinity of the State
House primarily to preserve a beautiful setting for public structures
in which the public had invested its funds. The court's decision in
Welch v. Swasey25 was based on public safety, in that height regula-
tions were required to protect the public against the danger of fire.
Aesthetics, however, were not to be completely ignored. Regulations
otherwise rooted in the public health, safety, and morals might also
have an aesthetic objective.
It was not long after Welch v. Siwasey that the courts reinforced the
attack to preserve community appearance. The police power was
available to regulate billboards because, if unregulated, these devices
provided a danger to the public health, safety, and morals. That the
billboards were also ugly, and that their ugliness played a part in stim-
ulating the enactment of restrictive legislation, was not fatal to the
exercise of the police power.2 6
Through the years the courts have shown an increased willingness
23. Proffitt, Public Esthetics and the Billboard, 16 CORNELL L. Q. 151 (1931).
24. City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting Co., 72 N.J.L. 285, 62 A. 267 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1905).
25. 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
26. St. Louis Gunning Advertisement Co. v. City of St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137
S.W. 929 (1911), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 231 U.S. 761 (1913). See also
Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); Murphy, Inc. v.
Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944).
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to recognize and give effect to aesthetic considerations.27 Perhaps the
strongest statement by a state court is that of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts. 2 In answer to an argument that the sign
regulations were promulgated primarily to protect scenic beauty the
court said:29
Grandeur and beauty of scenery contribute highly important
factors to the public welfare of the state. To preserve such
landscape from defacement promotes the public welfare and
is a public purpose....
Even if the rules and regulations of billboards and other
advertising devices did not rest upon the safety of public
travel and the promotion of the comfort of travelers by ex-
clusion of undesired intrusion, we think that the preserva-
tion of scenic beauty and places of historical interest would be
sufficient to support them. Considerations of taste and fitness
may be a proper basis for action in permitting and denying
permits for locations for advertising devices.
Adding weight to this body of authority are several cases decided by
Florida's Supreme Court upholding sign regulations designed to im-
prove community appearance.3 0
Aesthetic considerations have played an important role in legisla-
tion regulating junk yards, top soil removal31 sand, stone, and gravel
operations,32 and similar types of open land uses. Through zoning
27. Preferred Tires, Inc. v. Village of Hempstead, 173 Misc. 1017, 19 N.Y.S.2d
374 (Sup. Ct. 1940); General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 202
Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309 (1930) (prohibiting billboards within 500 feet of a park,
parkway, or boulevard); People v. Wolf, 127 Misc. 382, 216 N.Y.S. 741 (Co. Ct.),
rev'd 220 App. Div. 71, 220 N.Y.S. 656 (1926), appeal dismissed, 247 N.Y. 189,
159 N.E. 907 (1928). Following the same trend are Merritt v. Peters, 65 So. 2d
861 (Fla. 1953); Commonwealth v. Trimmer, 53 Dauphin Co. Rep. 91 (Pa.
1942); Churchill & Tait v. Rafferty, 32 Phillip. I. Rep. 580 (1915), appeal dis-
missed, 248 U.S. 591 (1918).
28. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Dep't of Public Works, 289 Mass.
149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935), appeal dismissed, 297 U.S. 725 (1936).
29. 289 Mass. at 185, 187, 193 N.E. at 816, 817.
30. Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1960); Dade County
v. Gould, 99 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1957); International Co. v. City of Miami Beach,
90 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 1956); City of Miami Beach v. Ocean and Inland Co., 147
Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364 (1941).
31. Krantz v. Town of Amherst, 192 Misc. 912, 80 N.Y.S.2d 812 (Sup. Ct.
1948); Lizza & Sons, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 19 Misc. 2d 403, 69 N.Y.S.2d
296 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd, 272 App. Div. 921, 71 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1947).
32. Town of Burlington v. Dunn, 318 Mass. 216, 61 N.E.2d 243, cert. denied
326 U.S. 739 (1945); see also Town of Billerica v. Quinn, 320 Mass. 687, 71
N.E.2d 235 (1947).
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and other types of land use controls, these uses have been regulated
and even prohibited.
The Oregon Supreme Court upheld the total exclusion of automo-
bile wrecking yards from Oregon City.33 The Court stated the prin-
cipal question: "Whether the city can wholly exclude a use of property
on the sole ground that the use is offensive to aesthetic sensibilities,"
and gave its answer: "Aesthetic considerations alone may warrant an
exercise of the police power." 34
In upholding a statute prohibiting unscreened junk yards near
highways, Kentucky's highest court rested its decision on the proposi-
tion that aesthetics is a proper basis for police power regulation a5 In
view of the most recent decisions, and the new impetus provided by
the federal government, it seems most probable that the courts will
continue to give a more realistic appraisal to the value of aesthetics.
F. Historic Preservation
Regulations designed to protect historic buildings and sites and
the aesthetic quality of the state have been established on solid legal
ground, partly because of the close relationship between the economic
value of these assets to the general well-being of the state. Preserva-
tion of historic neighborhoods, sites, and buildings has also been the
object of legislation basing its rationale entirely on cultural and aes-
thetic values. New Orleans,6 Nantucket,37 Williamsburg,38 Philadel-
phia,39 Santa Barbara,40 and Santa Fe4l are but a few cities that have
enacted architectural controls to preserve an aesthetic historic quality.
All of these regulations were designed to control the exterior archi-
tectural design of existing and future buildings. When these legisla-
tive acts have been subjected to judicial scrutiny, they have been, with
rare exception, upheld time after time. The only possible constitu-
tional rationale for the validity of such laws must be their contribu-
33. Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965).
34. 240 Ore. at 46, 49, 400 P.2d at 261, 262.
35. Jasper v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1964). See also Delmar
v. Planning and Zoning Bd. of Town of Milford, 19 Conn. Supp. 21, 109 A.2d
604 (1954).
36. La. Const. 1921, art. 14, § 22A (added in 1936); New Orleans, La., Ordi-
nance No. 14,538, amended by Ordinance No. 15,085.
37. Mass. Laws 1955, ch. 601.
38. Williamsburg, Va., Ordinance No. 21, § 23-45 (1951).
39. Philadelphia, Pa., Zoning and Planning Code § 14-2005 (1959).
40. Santa Barbara, Cal., Ordinance No. 2228, § 1 (1949).
41. Santa Fe, N.M., Ordinance No. 1957-18 (1957).
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tion to the general welfare, and this is possible because of the aesthetic
values involved.
The New Orleans Ordinance has been sustained in several cases42
leaving no doubt that the preservation of aesthetic values is a part of
the general welfare which justifies the use of the police power. In
addition to the value of aesthetics the court found that preservation
also added economic benefits to the community. In City of New Or-
leans v. Lery43 the court said:
Perhaps esthetic considerations alone would not warrant
an imposition of the several restrictions contained in Vieux
Carre Commission Ordinance. But . . . this legislation is
in the interest of and beneficial to inhabitants of New Orleans
generally, the preserving of the Vieux Care section being not
only for its sentimental value but also for its commercial
value, and hence it constitutes a valid exercise of the police
power.
Enhancing the economy of the community thus appears to have
gained acceptance in judicial opinions concerned with aesthetics and
historic preservation. There has been a strong line of recent dedisions
establishing the validity of architectural controls which rely upon the
police power to regulate the appearance of building facades in his-
toric areas. The rationale for these decisions seems to rest squarely on
aesthetic considerations and the economic well-being of the commu-
nity involved. It was obvious to the highest court in Massachusetts,
for example, that Nantucket and certain areas of Boston attracted
visitors primarily because of their scenic and historic qualities. Any
act, the court reasoned, that would destroy this quality would by its
incongruity diminish the economic vitality of the areas involved.4 4 Fol-
lowing a similar line of reasoning, the Supreme Courts of New Mex-
ico45 and New Hampshire s have upheld architectural controls.
Developing the concept and validity of architectural control is only
part of the total program. To be effective, such controls must be
42. City of New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953); City of
New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 952, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941); City of New Or-
leans v. Impastato, 198 La. 206, 3 So. 2d 559 (1941).
43. 223 La. at 28, 29, 64 So. 2d at 802, 803 (1953).
44. Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 773, 780, 128 N.E.2d 557, 562 (1955).
45. City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13(1964).
46. Town of Deering ex rel Bittenbender v. Tibbetts, 105 N.H. 481, 202 A.2d
232 (1964).
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designed as reasonable regulations. Moreover, they must be capable
of enforcement by competent administrative officials. In 1959, the
Rhode Island legislature authorized historic area zoning. An historic
zone was established by South Kingston, and a seven-man commis-
sion was required to pass upon the exterior appearance of all pro-
posed construction. The ordinance applied to buildings of historic
and architectural significance and required other buildings to be gen-
erally compatible. It was also specifically provided that design should
not be limited to any one period of architectural style. A brick addi-
tion connecting two clapboard church buildings was rejected by the
Commission, but reversed by the Board of Appeals. The Board's de-
cision was based on its opinion that the brick construction was gen-
erally compatible. The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the
Board and the general validity of the local ordinance.4 7 Because the
regulations were carefully drawn and wisely administered, the court
could find adequate standards for administrative judgment.
G. Other Aesthetic Controls
Communities have long relied upon the police power to accomplish
aesthetic goals in other regulatory contexts. For example, minimum
lot area regulations in zoning ordinances have been upheld because
of judicial approval of an underlying aesthetic motivation. There is
a growing judicial awareness of the interrelationship of community
appearance and the general welfare. 4 8
By relying so heavily upon the effect of a minimum lot area or
building size regulation on property values, it seems almost inescapable
that the courts are finding that community appearance (aesthetics)
has a direct relationship to property values, and therefore, regulations
designed to protect property values justify the exercise of the police
power.
49
47. Hayes v. Smith, 92 R.I. 173, 167 A.2d 546 (1961).
48. Rodda, The Accomplishment of Aesthetic Purposes Under the Police Power,
27 So. CAL. L. REV. 149 (1954).
49. Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693, ap-
peal dismissed 344 U.S. 919 (1953). See also Cromwell v. Farrrier, 19 N.Y.2d
263, 225 N.E.2d 749(1967); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272(1963). These cases explicitly recognize the relevance of aesthetic objectives to
the implementation of zoning and police powers. For other large lot cases accepting
aesthetic justifications see Fischer v. Bedminster Township, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d
378 (1952) (five acres); Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d
516 (1942) (one acre).
A study of the early zoning decisions clearly indicates that aesthetic considera-
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Concern for visual attractiveness has induced some communities to
enact architectural controls, but there are relatively few cases testing
their validity. However, it would appear obvious that these ordi-
nances, in attempting to regulate and control exterior design, must
find their justification in aesthetic considerations. Architectural con-
trol has received very strong approval by the Wisconsin supreme
court.50 The Village of Fox Point had enacted a "look alike" ordi-
nance which prohibited the issuance of a building permit unless its
Building Board found as a matter of fact that "the exterior architec-
tural appeal and functional plan [would] not be so at variance with
either the exterior architectural appeal and functional plan of the
structures already contructed or in the course of construction in the
immediate neighborhood . . . as to cause substantial depreciation in
property values. . . ." The decision upholding the ordinance rests
heavily upon the reasoning expressed in the earlier lot area and build-
ing size cases which related the regulation to the preservation of
property values and, therefore, to the general welfare.51
tions were a part of the rationale for regulation, although not in themsel cs suf-
ficient reason to uphold the validity of zoning. Nevertheless, these cases gave new
meaning to the expansiveness of the general welfare as used in the police power.
The exclusion of certain uses from various use districts was upheld on grounds of
public health, safety, and general welfare in which aesthetic considerations played
an important if not exclusive role. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926); Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120 (1925). One
of the earliest zoning cases to reach a state supreme court was State ex rel, Civello
v. City of New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923). The court relied upon
aesthetic considerations in upholding an ordinance excluding retail uses from resi-
dential districts.
50. State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69
N.W.2d 217 (1955). Cf. City of West Palm Beach v. State ex rel. Duffey, 158
Fla. 863, 30 So. 2d 491 (1947).
51. 269 Wis. at 270, 69 N.W.2d at 222. See also Reid v. Architectural Bd. of
Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963); Hankins v. Borough of Rock-
leigh, 55 N.J. Super. 132, 150 A.2d 63 (App. Div. 1959).
The federal and state courts have also long recognized the power of govern-
ment to spend public funds for public parks which serve to enhance the amenities
of life and the appearance of the community. United States v. Gettysburg Electric
Ry., 160 U.S. 688 (1896); NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.516 (3d ed. 1950).
The use of tax dollars to acquire land for median strips within highway for pur-
poses of landscaping is justified as a public purpose. In re: Matter of Clinton Ave-
nue, 57 App. Div. 166, 68 N.Y.S. 196 (1901). See also Bunyan v. Commissioner of
Palisades Interstate Park, 167 App. Div. 457, 153 N.Y.S. 622 (1915). The creation
and preservation of scenic values was further strengthened by the decision of tile
United States Supreme Court in Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S.
700 (1923). Condemnation of land for a highway was upheld as a public purpose
because its location would afford the traveler a beautiful view. Citation to the
famous dictum in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954), is also appropriate.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The preservation of unique scenic values by use of the police
power, if subjected to judicial review, will be measured by the objec-
tives to be accomplished and the reasonableness of selecting the ob-
jects to be regulated. If these objectives have a substantial relationship
to the public welfare and the classification is logically in keeping with
the legislative objective, the constitutional requirements for validity
will have been met. The police power is used to regulate the use of
land simply because uncontrolled use would be detrimental to the
public interest.5 2
The view from the highway has become a principal concern of fed-
eral legislation, and a national policy has been expressed in the several
federal-aid highway programs. Highways must be planned and con-
structed to do much more than merely provide the cheapest distance
between two points. Highway facilities are an integral part of the
environment, and their success requires aesthetic as well as engineer-
ing quality.
Implementation of the national highway policy is no different from
implementation of the state's policy of preserving its unique scenic
characteristics through a system of land use regulations based upon
the police power. Aesthetic preservation of historic and cultural areas
would appear to be within the limits of the police power. Judicial
opinions have made major strides toward establishing aesthetic con-
siderations on their own merits as a justification for the use of the
police power. However, if the judicial attitude is such that beauty
cannot be recognized alone, there is no longer any question that legis-
lation which is designed to protect and enhance scenic values and
which contributes to the economic value of the community is a valid
exercise of the police power.
52. Vartelas v. Water Resources Cornm'n, 146 Conn. 650, 153 A.2d 822
(1959).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol1968/iss1/8
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
AN ACT TO PRESERVE AND TO ENHANCE SCENIC VALUES IN THE STATE
OF VERMONT WHICH ARE ADJACENT TO OR CAN BE SEEN FROM STATE
HIGHWAYS, INCLUDING THE FEDERAL INTERSTATE HIGHWAY SYSTEM, BY
REGULATING THE USE OF LAND ADJACENT TO SUCH HIGHWAYS AND BY
AUTHORIZING THE ACQUISITION OF LAND AND VARIOUS TYPES OF RIGHTS
AND INTERESTS IN LAND.*
IT IS HEREBY ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF
VERMONT.
SECTION 1. LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS. [omitted]
SECTION 2. PURPOSES.
In order to deal with the problems set forth in Section 1, the pro-
visions of this act are designed to preserve and to enhance scenic
values as seen from highways in Vermont; to retain Vermont residents
and to attract new residents and tourists, and thereby to strengthen
the base of the recreation industry and to increase employment and
income, business, and investment, and to support existing businesses;
to support state and local tax systems; to enable the state to plan its
orderly growth in the face of increased pressures from metropblitan
areas to the north and south and particularly to deal with the impact
of the Federal Interstate Highway System; to provide for the enjoy-
ment of scenic values and thus to contribute to physical and mental
health and to preserve the traditional American countryside.
SECTION 3. DEFINITIONS AND RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.
For the purposes of this act the following words and terms shall be
defined and interpreted in accordance with the provisions set forth
in this section.
(a) Definitions.
(1) State highway. A "state highway" shall include any
public road for-which federal or state funds are expended,
whether for acquisition, construction, maintenance or other
purposes.
(2) Junk yard. [omitted]
(3) Areas used for commerce or industry. [omitted].
(4) Ridgetop. "Ridgetop" applies to land on the side of a
ridge beyond its crest for such distance as may be required to
* This statute was drafted by Mr. Fonoroff, and by Norman Williams, Jr.,
Visiting. Professor of Law, Rutgers University. It was introduced in somewhat
modified form in the Vermont legislature, but was not enacted into law.
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assure that any building or other structure regulated by this
act cannot be seen from a state highway.
(5) Settled area. [omitted]
(6) Scenery Preservation Council. The "scenery preserva-
tion council" is an advisory body appointed by the Governor
to advise and assist the State Planning Director in the per-
formance of his duties with respect to this act.
(7) Cultural centers. "Cultural centers" are those land
areas within which are carried on the study or performance of
music, literature, history, and art, including such places as the
Marlboro music festival site.
(b) Rules of Construction. [omitted]
SECTION 4. PROTECTION OF UNIQUE SCENIC AREAS.
The General Assembly finds that within the state there are areas of
special and unique scenic significance. These scenic areas have tangible
values that are significant contributions to the economic well-being
of the state. They also represent less measurable, but equally impor-
tant, intangible values that contribute significantly to the spiritual and
physical well-being of its citizens.
The rapid expansion and urbanization of the metropolitan areas
to the south and to the north, and the increasing pressures for de-
velopment within the state, are threatening to encroach upon and
destroy these special and unique assets, which therefore require
immediate protection in the public interest. The regulations set
forth below are established to protect these areas of special and unique
significance, by encouraging the use of land in private ownership
which will enhance the value of such areas.
(a) Scenic Corridors Along the Federal Interstate High-
way System. The Federal Interstate Highway System provides
a unique opportunity within Vermont to see a wide variety
of views as one continuous scenic experience for unusually
long distances.
Along any Federal Interstate Highway, the uses listed in Sec-
tion 4 (e) shall not be located within one-half (1/) mile of
the right-of-way of such a highway, or between such right-of-
way and a ridgetop, whichever distance is less. However,
these restrictions are modified for areas around an inter-
change as provided in section 4 (f) below. The regulations set
forth in section 4 () shall also apply to permitted uses along
such highways.
(b) Intermediate-Traffic Scenic Corridors. A series of
scenic corridors within the state, as described in the State
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Comprehensive Plan, each extending for at least ten (10)
miles and with an intermediate volume of traffic, provides a
remarkable continuity of visual experience in passes through
the Green Mountains or in a series of ridges and valleys of
extraordinary scenic beauty, almost without interruption.
These scenic corridors are along the following highways:
[the highways are then named.]
Along the state highways, listed above, except within incor-
porated villages, the uses listed in section 4 (e) shall not be
located within one-half (1/2) mile of the right-of-way of such
highways, or between such right-of-way and a ridgetop, which.
ever distance is less. The regulations set forth in section 4 (1)
shall also apply to permitted uses along such highways.
(c) Scenic Sites. Along state highways in Vermont there
are scenic sites of special and unique value, representing ma-jor features of the state's historic heritage and of her culturallife, past and present. The following are such scenic sites:
Small cemeteries
Covered bridges
Historic sites, designated as significant by the Vermont
Board of Historic Sites
Village greens and small rural churches, designated as
significant by the Vermont Board of Historic Sites
Educational institutions
Cultural centers
Public parks
Lake shores
Along any state highway, except in an area predominantly
used for commerce or industry (as defined in section 3), the
uses listed in section 4 (e) shall not be located within five
hundred (500) feet of the boundary of, or so located to ob-
scure the view of, any of the scenic sites listed above. The
regulations set forth in section 4 (f) shall also apply to per-
mitted uses along such highways.
(d) Designated Areas of Special Scenic Value. Along state
highways in Vermont there are other types of scenic sites,
whose special and unique significance depends upon their
natural setting. The following are such scenic sites:
Rivers and streams
Marshes, wildlife preserves, and other areas of special
ecological values
A strip of land along such highways from which a view
of mountain ranges, mountains, or lakes is observable for
at least five hundred (500) feet along the highway
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The approaches to historic towns
The approaches to major outdoor recreation areas
Along any state highway, except in an area predominantly
used for commerce or industry (as defined in section 3), the
uses listed in section 4 (e) shall not be located within five hun-
dred (500) feet of the boundary of, or so located to obscure
the view of, any of the special scenic areas designated in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this section. The regulations
set forth in section 4 (f) shall also apply to permitted uses
along such highways.
(1) Criteria for designation of such areas. The State
Planning Director with the advice of the Scenery Preservation
Council shall designate specific areas of special scenic value as
described above as part of a scenery preservation plan and
shall consider the following factors in selecting such specific
areas:
The primeval character of land area, although not neces-
sarily completely undisturbed
The importance of conservation of wildlife and flora
The existence of rare or vanishing species of plant life,
or other unique or characteristic combinations and pat-
terns of form, color, and texture of natural phenomena
Geological and ecological quality and significance
The historical and scenic significance of settlements, and
the historical significance of other areas
(2) Notice and Public Hearing. [omitted]
(e) Prohibited Uses. The uses listed below shall not be
located within the protected areas established in paragraphs
(a) through (d) of this section 4:
Amusement parks
Automobile repair garages
Bowling alleys and similar amusement establishments
Drive-in theatres
Dumps
Eating establishments, except those located in residential
buildings. No exterior alteration affecting the residential
character of the building, no identification sign larger
than twenty four (24) square feet in total area shall be
permitted
Filling stations
Gravel pits
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Junk yards
Open storage of non-agricultural products, such as lum-
ber, builders' supplies, heavy machinery and equipment,
tires, etc.
Motels
Natural gas or petroleum storage tanks which are located
above ground
Outdoor advertising signs
Quarries
Trailer parks
Trucking terminals
Used car sales lots
(f) Other Use Regulations. All permitted uses located
within the protected areas established in paragraphs (a)
through (d) of this section 4 shall conform to the regulations
set forth below:
(1) Residential lot size. All new residences shall be lo-
cated on parcels having a minimum lot area of two (2) acres,
except when located within settled areas or along lake shores.
(2) Essential motorist service facilities. Gasoline service
stations, automobile repair garages, motels, and eating estab-
lishments, may be located in the area within one-half (1/2)
mile of the edge of the right-of-way of any part of an inter-
change with a Federal Interstate Highway.
(3) Signs. Only one (1) sign identifying the name and ad-
dress of a permitted use, and the products or services offered,
is permitted. A "for sale" or "for rent" sign may be per-
mitted, but not to exceed twelve (12) square feet in total
area.
All other permitted signs shall not exceed twenty-four (24)
square feet in total area. A permitted sign shall not project
more than one (1) foot in any direction if attached to a
building, and in no case shall any sign exceed a height of
eighteen (18) feet above the average finished grade level of
the premises upon which it is located.
Permitted signs may be lighted by continuous illumination
only, and shall be so erected that the source of light is not
visible from outside the premises. Flashing, moving, or me-
chanical signs of any kind shall not be permitted.
If any type of lighting is used to illuminate or outline the
shape of any building or part thereof, the same regulations
shall apply.
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(4) Sale of farm produce. Nothing in this act shall be con-
strued to prohibit the sale of farm produce.
(5) Non-conforming uses. Except as otherwise provided by
law, the restrictions of this section shall not apply to any
establishment listed in section 4 (e) that has been in existence
and active operation prior to the effective date of this act.
(6) Violation. [omitted]
(7) Penalty [omitted]
(8) Application of overlapping regulations. [omitted]
SECTION 5. ACQUISITION OF RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN LAND. [This
part of the statute has been omitted]
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